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REFLEXIVITY, FUNCTIONAL REFERENCE, AND
MODULARITY: ALTERNATIVE TARGETS FOR LANGUAGE
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TRAVIS LACROIX
Abstract. Researchers in language origins typically try to explain how com-
positional communication might evolve to bridge the gap between animal com-
munication and natural language. However, as an explanatory target, compo-
sitionality has been shown to be problematic for a gradualist approach to the
evolution of language. In this paper, I suggest that reflexivity provides an apt
and plausible alternative target which does not succumb to the problems that
compositionality faces. I further explain how proto-reflexivity, which depends
upon functional reference, gives rise to complex communication systems via
modular composition.
Keywords — reflexivity, language origins, explanatory targets, functional ref-
erence, modular composition, compositionality, animal communication
1. Introduction
Communication is ubiquitous in nature: every taxon that has been investigated
displays some form of communication system (Kight et al., 2013). However, lin-
guistic communication—i.e., natural language—is (or at least is often taken to be)
unique to humans. This raises the question; how did language evolve? That is, how
did rich linguistic communication systems like the ones we see in humans evolve
out of simpler non-linguistic systems of communication? This is an inherently diffi-
cult question due to a lack of direct evidence—language does not fossilise, and we
cannot observe the actual precursors of human language in, e.g., extinct hominin
ancestors.
Nonetheless, work on language origins has blossomed in recent decades. New
data, increasingly sophisticated techniques and technologies, and productive inter-
disciplinary research have helped foster the development of subtle models of lan-
guage evolution. This is achieved using a multi-component approach to understand
the mechanisms underlying language and how they might have evolved (Fitch,
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2017). For example, comparative methods in evolutionary biology start by breaking
down a complex trait into multiple subcomponent mechanisms or features (Fitch,
2017; Martinez, 2018). We can then examine the presence or absence of traits, in
phylogenetic terms, to infer facts about whether some particular trait common to
several species is a homologue or an analogue. Computer simulations further provide
a concrete and explicit way to test hypotheses (Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002), furnish-
ing a how-possibly explanation of the sort that is common in evolutionary biology
(Resnik, 1991). However, the plausibility of these results requires figuring empirical
evidence from relevant fields—in the case of language origins, this includes evidence
from biology, linguistics, animal communication, neuroscience, and more.
The most common feature of natural language that is appealed to as a gap-
bridging explanatory target is compositionality (and related features like hierarchy
and recursion). The idea is that if we could explain how compositional communi-
cation can evolve out of non-compositional communication, we would have taken
great strides in explaining how language evolved. However, this is problematic inso-
far as (1) compositionality, in an evolutionary context, proffers asymmetric benefits
for senders and receivers of signals, and researchers have not maintained adequate
sensitivity to this role-asymmetry (LaCroix, 2020a); (2) there is no empirical ev-
idence for proto-compositional communication as a precursor to natural language
insofar as the oft-cited evidence is more likely homologous to human-level linguistic
compositionality than analogous (LaCroix, 2019a); and (3) there is no gradualist
explanation of compositionality, insofar as this is a binary property of language
(Berwick and Chomsky, 2011; LaCroix, 2020b).
In this paper, I propose that reflexivity—the ability to use language to talk
about language—provides an apt and plausible alternative explanatory target for
language-origins research. I further explain how proto-reflexivity, which depends
upon functional reference, gives rise to complex communication systems via mod-
ular composition. I argue that reflexivity does not succumb to the problems that
compositionality faces since (1) role asymmetries are accounted for by the underly-
ing mechanism of functional reference, (2) there exists empirical evidence of plau-
sible precursors to reflexivity in nature, (3) the precursors of reflexivity are graded.
Finally, reflexivity allows for rich compositional structures that have been shown
to give rise to genuinely compositional syntax.
2. Proto-reflexivity, functional reference, and their evolutionary
precursors
Communication is a unique evolutionary system in the following sense. Once a
group of individuals has learned some simple communication convention, those
learned behaviours may be used to influence future communicative behaviour,
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thereby affecting future communication conventions. This may give rise to a feed-
back loop, wherein more complex communication, in turn, is used to influence future
communicative behaviours which are even more sophisticated.
When faced with a novel context, individuals can always learn a brand-new dis-
position from scratch. However, in some cases, it may be more advantageous or
more efficient to utilise a pre-evolved disposition. When individuals take advantage
of pre-evolved communicative dispositions to thereby influence future communica-
tion, this is a form of proto-reflexivity. Such an ability is an evolutionary precursor
to the reflexivity of natural languages, wherein one can use language to talk about
language.
Proto-reflexivity depends primarily upon functional reference, which has been
the subject of much empirical and theoretical work in animal communication (Siev-
ers and Gruber, 2016). Functional reference is so-called because it is meant to evoke
the idea of reference in language without being equivalent to reference in the way
that words refer. So, the ability to refer functionally is an evolutionary precursor
to the ability to refer linguistically. Signals are functionally referential if they are
‘elicited by a special class of stimuli and capable of causing behaviours adaptive to
such stimuli in the absence of contextual cues’ (Scarantino, 2013, 1006).1 They are
therefore context-specific for the signaller to produce, and stimulus-independent for
the receiver to understand. This can be defined formally, as in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1: (Strong) Functional Reference
A token of type X functionally refers to a token of type Y just in case the
following two criteria are jointly satisfied:
(1) Production Criterion: Xs are reliably caused (only/mostly) by Y s;
(2) Perception Criterion:Xs presentations reliably cause responses adap-
tive to Y s in the absence of Y s and any other contextual cues.
For example, vervet monkey (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) alarm calls are suggested
(Seyfarth et al., 1980) to be functionally referential since the presence of an eagle
(Y ) reliably causes an eagle alarm call (X), satisfying the production criterion.
Furthermore, the presentation of an eagle alarm call (X) reliably causes recipients
to hide in the bush (an adaptive response to the presence of an eagle, Y ), satisfying
the perception criterion. Playback experiments suggest that these responses occur
in the absence of other contextual cues.
Female Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana) elicit alarm calls upon viewing a
predator first-hand and respond to alarm calls of male Diana monkeys by repeating
the call. Zuberbu¨hler et al. (1999) perform playback experiments of various pairs
1See also Macedonia and Evans (1993).
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of stimuli—a matching pair consists of an alarm call followed by the sound of the
predator to which the call functionally refers; a mismatched pair consists of an
alarm call followed by the sound of a predator to which the call does not function-
ally refer. In each case, pairs of stimuli are separated by five minutes of silence. In
the experiment, the female monkeys displayed less concern upon hearing, e.g., the
characteristic shriek of an eagle five minutes after the eagle alarm call—the for-
mer conveys no new information. However, they showed significant concern upon
hearing a characteristic leopard growl five minutes after hearing the eagle alarm
call. The conclusion is that alarm calls do not just serve to trigger (behaviourally
or deterministically) an evasive response: individuals have an ‘idea’—what Hurford
(2007) terms a ‘proto-concept’—of the relevant predator in mind for at least five
minutes following the initial alarm call.
We might worry about the strength of Definition 2.1 since, for example, aggres-
sion signals may functionally refer to future aggressive behaviour, though it perhaps
seems strange to say they are caused by it. We can weaken this by indexing to a
context and replacing causation with correlation, as in Definition 2.2 (Scarantino,
2013):
Definition 2.2: (Weak) Functional Reference
A token of type X in context C functionally refers to a token of type Y
just in case the following two criteria are jointly satisfied:
(1) Contextual Information Criterion: Xs in context C are corre-
lated with Y s (weakly or strongly);
(2) Contextual Perception Criterion: Xs presentations in context C
reliably cause responses adaptive to Y s in the absence of Y s.
This is information-theoretic because X carries information about Y just in case
Xs and Y s are correlated.2 The intuition is that the signal and the functional
referent must correlate enough to make responding to the signal in ways that are
adaptive to the referent evolutionarily advantageous.
Functional reference, and therefore proto-reflexivity, minimally requires several
communicative precursors, including arbitrariness, specialisation, semanticity, dis-
creteness, and displacement (Hockett, 1960). Arbitrariness requires that there is
no ‘natural’ connection between a linguistic form and its meaning; this contrasts
with iconic signals where there is a similarity between the form of a sign and
its meaning—e.g., onomatopoeia in natural language. Specialisation requires that
the signal produced is intended for communication, and not because of another
2This dovetails nicely with the role that information transfer plays in studies of animal communi-
cation (see Stegmann (2013), though cf. Dawkins and Krebs (1978)), as well as theoretical work
in philosophy on meaning as informational content; see Skyrms (2010a,b).
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behaviour; this contrasts with cues, which are a byproduct of some other (non-
communicative) process—e.g., the presence of CO2 transfers information about the
location of a mammal, though exhalation of CO2 did not evolve for this purpose.
Semanticity requires that there is a relationship between a signal and its meaning.
However, these three features of communication are early-evolving abilities that are
common to mammals generally. Discreteness means that signals are perceived cat-
egorically, as opposed to continuously; this feature is present in primates generally.
Finally, displacement is the ability to talk about things that are not present in the
immediate environment.
Consider a situation where individuals coordinate upon a communication con-
vention, like in a simple signalling game (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2010a). In this case,
the messages may functionally refer to the states of the world—as in the vervet
monkey alarm call system. Now, suppose that this signalling situation occurs in a
pre-evolved context. Suppose further that there is a novel context in which indi-
viduals must learn a new communication system. In some cases, the output of the
novel signalling context may be an appropriate input for the pre-evolved signalling
context (Barrett and Skyrms, 2017; LaCroix, 2020c); see Figure 1.
Pre-evolved context
Novel context
s0
s1
m0
m1
a0
a1
s∗0
s∗1
m∗0
m∗1
a∗0
a∗1
functionally refers to
functionally refers to
Figure 1
However, signals functionally refer to states in the pre-evolved context, and the
states are just the output of the communication system in the novel context; so,
messages come to functionally refer to the communication system itself, in a way
that is proto-reflexive: they functionally refer to a communication context as a
whole, rather than linguistic symbols themselves. In such a situation, discrete, ar-
bitrary, and meaningful signals, which are specialised for communicative purposes,
come to (functionally) refer to something abstract, in a sense, and so displaced from
the immediate environment.
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How might such a property or ability evolve? This happens by way of modu-
lar composition and related processes. Various processes of this sort may include
appropriation or template transfer, analogical reasoning, or genuine modular com-
position.
3. Modular composition and related processes
3.1. Transfer (of) Learning. The simplest way of evolving new strategies from
old strategies is appropriation. This process, minimally, requires the following. First,
the agents must have evolved a disposition for a particular context. The agents then
face a novel context, where the prior disposition just happens to be appropriate—
though this may not be known at the outset. This novel context may be relevantly
similar, but non-trivially distinct, from the original context. Appropriation then
consists in applying the prior strategy to the novel context. It may be that the
agent happens, by chance, to try something pre-evolved when faced with a novel
context. The appropriateness of the pre-evolved strategy may determine a suffi-
ciently beneficial reward such that, when faced with this same context again, the
agent learns quickly (even by simple reinforcement) to perform the old action. This
simple form of appropriation is sometimes called transfer (of) learning.3
This allows for flexibility of behaviour in problem-solving, via the ability to gen-
eralise learned rules to novel contexts. There is good evidence that many species of
new- and old-world monkeys, as well as great apes, are capable of transfer; however,
prosimians are not (Rumbaugh, 1970, 1971, 1995; Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a,b;
Bonte et al., 2014). One example of transfer learning in nonhuman animals is an
extension of classification tasks, involving ‘reversal learning’. Here, an animal is
trained to associate a particular stimulus with a reward. Once the agent exhibits
some degree of success, the relation between the stimulus and the reward reverses,
so the agent must replace the prior association with the opposite association. If
the animal can quickly reverse its associations, it is assumed that successful per-
formance is based on a concept of oppositeness. On the other hand, if the new
association takes as long or longer to be learned, no such application of conceptual
understanding may be attributed to the agent.4
Minimally, transfer learning requires only that an agent try prior strategies.
Successful strategies may be learned via simple reinforcement, or they may be dis-
covered via a more sophisticated trial-and-error. When salience is present—e.g., the
physical properties of a new predator being saliently similar to an old predator—the
3See, e.g., Ellis (1965); Schunk (2004); Pugh and Bergin (2006); Hung (2013).
4Hurford (2007) argues that reversal learning experiments do not merely highlight an ability to
apply the relation of oppositeness between a source and a target context; instead, the agent ‘seems
to be keeping its old mental representation (concept) of the general class of stimuli acquired in
the first training regime and relating the new set to that acquired concept’ (25).
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new strategy may be implemented immediately; however, this is a more sophisti-
cated version of transfer learning, which requires a concept of analogical similarity.
3.2. Analogical Reasoning. The most common way of testing analogical reason-
ing ability is with a set of analogy problems known as relational matching-to-sample
(RMTS) tasks.5 This experimental task involves showing the agent a sample set,
which consists of two or more objects that are either identical or non-identical. The
agent is then shown two comparison sets, which contain novel objects—one of which
involves identity, and the other of which involves non-identity. To be successful, the
agent must choose the comparison set which matches the sample set.
In this case, the analogy between various stimuli requires a concept of Same
versus Different. As with transfer learning, there is some evidence that nonhu-
man animals can utilise analogical reasoning. Despite prior belief to the contrary
(Thompson and Oden, 2000), it has been shown experimentally that some apes (im-
portantly, chimpanzees) can perform these tasks easily. Other apes and very few
old-world monkeys can perform these tasks, but only after extensive training. In
each case, symbolic training results in better performance, implying a relationship
between cognition and linguistic ability.6
Noting and taking advantage of analogy is more cognitively complex than sim-
ple transfer. Increasing complexity again, we arrive at a full concept of modular
composition.
3.3. Modular Composition. Finally, modular composition itself varies in com-
plexity, but the most complex forms are supposed to be unique to humans and
to depend upon language. Spelke (2003) suggests that humans and other animals
are endowed with early-developing, core systems of knowledge, called ‘modules’.
However, these core systems are limited in several ways. First, they are domain-
specific, since these modules represent only a subset of entities in the surroundings
of the agent. Second, they are task-specific, since they inform only a subset of the
repertoire of the agent’s actions and cognitive processes. Third, they are (at least
relatively) encapsulated, since there is a restriction on the flow of information into
and out of a module. Finally, modules are (at least relatively) isolated from one
another, since they do not readily combine (Spelke, 2003, 291).7
5See Skinner (1950); Blough (1959); Ferster (1960).
6See, e.g., Skinner (1950); Blough (1959); Ferster (1960); Fagot et al. (2001); Wasserman et al.
(2001); Katz et al. (2002); Flemming et al. (2011).
7See also Fodor (1983, 1984, 2000); Sherry and Schacter (1987); Sperber (1994); Coltheart (1999);
Sperber (2002); Carruthers (2002); Barrett and Kurzban (2006); Shettleworth (2012); Robbins
(2017).
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Many core cognitive capacities that are available to (and were once thought to be
unique to) humans are also available to nonhuman animals (Spelke, 2003).8 There-
fore, humans, but also nonhuman animals, have early-developing core knowledge
systems, which allow for a broad range of intelligent behaviour and cognitive ca-
pacities; and, in many cases, these same core systems enable nonhuman animals
to outperform human infants in similar tasks. Thus, core systems alone do not ac-
count for uniquely human cognitive capacities. Spelke (2003) suggests that human
cognitive capacities depend on core knowledge systems, which are shared by other
animals, and on a uniquely human combinatorial ability for conjoining these repre-
sentations to create new systems of knowledge. Furthermore, she suggests that the
latter capacity is made possible by natural language, which provides the medium for
combining the representations delivered by core knowledge systems (305). Specifi-
cally, it is the compositional nature of natural language, which gives rise to uniquely
flexible human cognition, on her account.
The basic communicative abilities that give rise to human linguistic capacities
are shared with many other species; however, the ability to produce and interpret
recursive structures is uniquely human (Hauser et al., 2002). If we assume that the
human capacity for language can be decomposed into a set of well-defined mecha-
nisms that interact via interfaces, then we can begin to examine how such interfaces
between individual components may ‘hook up’ in the first place. In essence, this is
the concept of modular composition as it is described in Barrett and Skyrms (2017).
Modular composition ties together explanations of complexity in communicative,
cognitive, and social structures.
4. Reflexivity as an explanatory target
Researchers typically propose evolutionary theories that explain how composi-
tionality arose, moving from a one-word stage (simple signalling), to a two-word
stage (combinatorial signalling), and eventually to (compositional) language.9 How-
ever, as was mentioned in the introduction, prioritising linguistic compositionality
as an explanatory target gives rise to significant theoretical and practical problems.
The novel approach to the evolution of language suggested here prioritises reflex-
ivity as an explanatory target. On this account, simple communicative capacities
evolve alongside cognitive capacities. Signals may become functionally referential,
referring to concrete objects in the world. Once individuals are able to make use
of proto-concepts, they can refer to abstracta. Therefore, they can refer to commu-
nicative contexts, giving rise to proto-reflexivity. This ability means that they can
8See empirical work in Wynn (1992); Simon et al. (1995); Koechlin et al. (1998); de Walle et al.
(2001); Feigenson et al. (2002). See Wynn (1998); Spelke (1998) for reviews of this literature.
9See, e.g., Bickerton (1990); Jackendoff (1999); Progovac (2015).
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influence future communicative behaviour via communication. Such capacities may
evolve by modular composition and related processes. Furthermore, it has been
demonstrated that reflexivity gives rise to functional composition (compositional
syntax) as a byproduct of these processes (LaCroix, 2019b).
Several recent works in the signalling game literature have demonstrated that
modular compositional processes, like the ones described here, are more efficient and
more effective for evolving or learning communication conventions than learning
novel dispositions from scratch, often by orders of magnitude (Barrett, 2016, 2017,
2020; Barrett and Skyrms, 2017; LaCroix, 2019b, 2020c; Barrett et al., 2020).
Furthermore, reflexivity does not succumb to the same problems that composi-
tionality does, as an explanatory target. It was mentioned in the introduction that
compositionality, as it is discussed in the literature, fails to maintain sensitivity to
role-asymmetries between producers and interpreters of signals (LaCroix, 2020a);
however, for reflexivity, this role-asymmetry is built-in via functional reference (Def-
initions 2.1; 2.2), which accounts for these differences by definition. Furthermore,
there are no empirical precursors to compositionality (LaCroix, 2019a), whereas
the processes by which reflexivity evolves are supported by significant empirical
evidence. Finally, compositionality is a binary property of language (Berwick and
Chomsky, 2011), meaning that there is no gradualist explanation of the evolution of
compositionality; in contrast, both reflexivity and the processes by which it might
arise are graded notions. In non-reflexive functionally-referential systems, signals
refer to states; in proto-reflexive functionally-referential systems, signals refer to
communicative contexts; and in reflexive language, words refer to linguistic enti-
ties. So, reflexivity is graded, but the processes by which it arises are also graded—
appropriation is simpler than analogical reasoning, which is simpler than modular
composition.
Finally, compositionality is focused too internally on language and syntax itself,
so explanations do not (or at least need not) take account of related cognitive
and social mechanisms that are important factors in the evolution of language.
On the other hand, reflexivity does. Therefore, there are significant practical and
theoretical reasons to replace compositionality with reflexivity as an explanatory
target for language origins research.
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